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The COVID-19 pandemic has drastically impacted migration and mobility around the globe, and by exten-
sion the way how we think and speak about migration. In this time of crisis, trust and public security have 
become primary concerns and spiralled the increasingly polarised rhetoric around migration we have seen 
emerging in recent years. This recent trend exacerbates the need for a balanced narrative on migration as 
a necessary pre-condition to safeguard an enabling environment for sound migration policy making and 
governance.
Promoting a deeper awareness and understanding of perceptions of and attitudes towards migration is 
imperative to move scientific evidence back to the core of the migration discourse, which in turn will 
help rebalance the narrative and consequently regain the public’s trust. This is particularly vital in the 
Euro-Mediterranean context, where migration can be considered part and parcel of the economic recovery 
if implemented in a conscientious and diligent way and on the basis of sound, effective migration policies. 
The third chapter of ICMPD’s “Impact of public attitudes to migration on the political environment in the Eu-
ro-Mediterranean region” makes a marked contribution to this critical matter by shedding light on different 
strategies and approaches to public communication on migration and how these can be rendered effective. 
Drafted before the outbreak of the current pandemic, the study’s recommendations ring even more true to-
day where efforts to do away with the widespread disinformation, which was exacerbated by the pandemic, 
must be intensified. Now more than ever, we need to provide policy-makers with evidence-based, responsive 
policy options to affront disinformation and ill-informed public perceptions of migration - a major chal-
lenge in the Euro-Mediterranean region and beyond.
Lukas Gehrke 




• This report starts by providing a summary of key recommendations from existing best-prac-
tice guides for migration communication
• The most common recommendation is to focus on values-based messaging.
• However, very little work has considered what values-based messaging is and what type of 
value-based messaging is likely to work regarding migration.
• This report then summarises the academic literature on values, focussing on Schwarz’s theory 
of basic human values: broad, stable motivational goals that individuals hold in life, which 
predict attitudes to specific issues and behaviour.
• The relationship between these ten values—universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformi-
ty, security, power, achievement, hedonism, self-direction and stimulation—is graphically dis-
played.
• It is shown that universalism, benevolence, stimulation and self-direction are associated with 
pro-immigration attitudes, whereas conformity, security, tradition and power are associated 
with anti-immigration attitudes.
• Aligning one’s migration policy communication with the target audience’s values is likely to 
elicit sympathy for the message. However, values-based messages that do not align with 
those of the audience are less likely to elicit sympathy and may elicit antipathy.
• This report then analyses migration policy communication examples from an inventory of 135 
campaigns from both sides of the Mediterranean provided by the ICMPD.
• It is then systematically considered how well these campaigns align with our expectations as 
derived from our theoretical framework.
• Few pro-migration campaigns contained value-based messaging, whereas all anti-migration 
campaigns did.
• Similarly, very few pro-migration campaigns included values besides ‘universalism’ and ‘be-
nevolence’, whereas anti-migration campaigns included values associated with both pro- and 
anti-migration attitudes.
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• Examples of each case are visually demonstrated.
• This report provides policymakers with an understanding of what values-based policy com-
munication is and how, using robust data, they can communicate policies that are concordant 
with the values of their audiences in a way likely to elicit sympathy.
• Although this report uses the example of migration policy communication, the same ap-
proach can be taken for policies on any politically controversial issue.
• Future migration policy communication that seeks to incorporate values should use a sys-
tematic approach such as that found in this report and seek to incorporate the values of the 
target audience
• Future research should robustly test the effects of each of these kinds of communication 
using experimental methods, be they field, lab or survey experiments.
• Alternative values-scheme and forms, psychological predispositions, for example, personality 
types, should also be considered.
• Furthermore, values schema and their operationalisations, some of which are now somewhat 
dated, should continue to be refined.
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Introduction
Studies of communication regarding migration have overwhelmingly focused on negative or unrepresenta-
tive portrayals of migrants in media, which are argued to often be hyperbolic in order to garner additional 
readers or viewers, or by political actors using such frames for strategic electoral reasons (e.g. King and 
Wood, 2001; Blassnig et al., 2019). As such, academic research on migration communication has tended to be 
drawn from the fields of media studies or political science. Research considering when strategic commu-
nication for less, arguably, nefarious reasons is effective has been less developed. Despite that, or perhaps 
because of it, in recent years a number of advocacy groups and NGOs have produced guides to communi-
cating on migration. Owing to their origin, either implicitly or explicitly these guides usually have had the 
aim of increasing the positivity to migrants or migration amongst the citizens and voters of host countries. 
For the same reason, they have typically been only partially rooted in robust or systematic scientific under-
standings of the relationship between types of communication and their effects on attitudes, though this 
does not necessarily reflect their credibility or usefulness.
This study places the most common recommendation from practitioners—that migration communication 
should be based on values—within the broader scientific literature by introducing Schwarz’s psychological 
theory of ‘basic human values’ and then using European Social Survey data to visualise the relationship 
between these values and attitudes to immigration, a relationship already well established in the political 
psychology literature. It is argued that messaging with a value-basis that is concordant with that of its 
audience is more likely to elicit sympathy, whereas that which is discordant with the values of its audience 
is more likely to elicit antipathy. Given the value-balanced orientations of those with moderate attitudes 
to immigration, persuasive migration messaging should also attempt to mobilise values of its opposition; 
i.e. pro-migration messaging should mobilise Schwarz’s values of conformity, tradition, security and power, 
whereas anti-migration messaging should mobilise values of universalism, benevolence, self-direction and 
stimulation.
The report then moves on to considering migration communication campaigns from both sides of the Med-
iterranean as produced by NGOs and public policy makers. This inventory of migration communication cam-
paigns was provided by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), an international 
organisation of 17 member states from Europe devoted to research, projects and activities on migration-re-
lated issues and to provide policy recommendations to the governmental agencies of states, as well as 
to external governmental and intergovernmental agencies and international organisations. The inventory 
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of migration campaigns, however, contains cases from around Europe as well as the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean. It is then systematically considered how well these campaigns align with our expectations 
as derived from our theoretical framework and shown that few pro-migration campaigns contained val-
ue-based messaging, whereas all anti-migration campaigns did. Similarly, very few pro-migration campaigns 
included values besides ‘universalism’ and ‘benevolence’, whereas anti-migration campaigns included values 
associated with both pro- and anti-migration attitudes. Examples of each case are demonstrated before 
discussing ramifications for policy communication.
Existing guides for migration communication 
The theoretical starting point for this report comes not from the academic literature, for which there is a 
still relatively underdeveloped literature considering what types of migration communication are effective 
(however, for  potentially relevant findings see Kalla and Broockman, 2020; Walter et al, 2019; Nelson and 
Garst, 2005; Bansak et al, 2017 ), but instead from the policymaker, or practitioner, literature. In recent years, 
migration advocacy groups have published a number of reports that outline recommendations for how to 
effectively communicate on migration issues in a way that might change attitudes. In this section, I overview 
the findings of six of these reports, five of which were published since 2017. In table 1, below, I synthesise 
these findings.
First, Hind Sharif (2019) of the Migration Policy Group offers a number of recommendations and policy op-
tions for ‘progressive communicators … to win the debate’ in “Communicating effectively on migration”. Over-
all, Sharif offers seven recommendations: (1) ‘develop a communications strategy and leadership’; (2) ‘choose 
credible messengers, including migrants, and embrace partnerships, including by producing lists for media 
of potential spokespeople’; (3) ‘apply value-based and emotive approaches’; (4) ‘lead with hope-based solu-
tions’; (5) ‘be visual’, again from a value-based and emotive standpoint; (6) ‘target a movable audience’, i.e. 
those with more moderate and less entrenched attitudes; and, (7) ‘support fair reporting.’ As we can see, the 
(1) and (7) relate to the institutions behind the communication; (2), (5) and (6) relate to the delivery of the 
communication and, only (3) and (4) relate to the content of the communication.
The recommendations of each of the guides are therefore split into these three types—institutions, delivery 
and content—in Table 1, below.
Second, Banulescu-Bogdan’s (2018) Migration Policy Institute report—‘When Facts Don’t Matter: How to 
Communicate More Effectively About Immigration’s Costs and Benefits’ argues that recent technological, 
political and media changes mean that an overabundance of ‘facts’ has undermined their social credibility. 
As such, the author proposes six lessons that communicators should keep in mind when communicating on 
migration: (1) ‘cost-benefit analyses may miss the point’ since economics is only one value under consider-
ation; (2) ‘avoid arguments that may be views as personal attacks’ or that criticise beliefs outright in order 
to avoid trigger defensive mechanisms regarding self- or group-identity; (3) ‘give people a way out instead 
of trying to prove them wrong’; (4) ‘avoid repeating false ideas—even to debunk them’; (5) ‘Engage credible 
messengers from across the aisle’; (6) ‘start building a culture of critical thinking long before an election 
cycle or crisis’.
Third, Marthouz’s (2006) ‘How to communicate: Strategic communication on migration and integration’ for 
the King Baudouin Foundation offers an exhaustive list of recommendations, with examples, including sec-
tions with recommendations regarding: the institutional arrangements that are likely to facilitate strategic 
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communication; for how to identify your target audience; how to frame messages; and later a range of rec-
ommendations for working with media and press and the different tools available to communicators. These 
are followed by seven ‘guiding principles’ regarding (1) the importance of values rather than facts alone; (2) 
be aware of and work around popular prejudices; (3) starting from a position of common ground; (4) neu-
tralising the opposition by undermining their arguments and thus at least prevent those in the middle from 
moving over; (5) similarly, ignore or undermine the most hostile; (6) be solutions-oriented and (7) coordinate 
with other NGOs. Marthouz then offers a series of ‘tips’, some of which may seem obvious though are still 
worth repeating, to be ‘confident’, ‘decent’, ‘clear, but without sloganeering’, ‘relevant to the audience’, and 
‘consistent’, to choose the right messenger and to multiply (i.e. repeat) core messages.
Fourth, Bamberg’s (2019) ‘Moving beyond the ‘crisis’: Recommendations for the European Commission’s com-
munication on migration’ makes six recommendations aimed at the European Commission, though useful 
for migration communicators generally. These are: (1) avoid increasing the salience of migration by adjusting 
the tone and content; (2) use more diverse frames, particularly avoiding crisis management, and speaking 
to economic and value-based issues; (3) use storytelling rather than just facts; (4) target audience groups; 
(5) make messaging digestible and relatable; and (6) correctly contextualise migration matters rather than 
linking them to erroneous issues, e.g. labour market reforms.
Fifth, Welcoming America’s (2018) report ‘Stand Together: Messaging to Support Muslims and Refugees in 
Challenging Times’ offer seven ‘principles’ to bear in mind for those ‘developing stories and messages’. These 
are: (1) craft messages to confront and reshape perceptions rather than realities; (2) appeal to emotion; (3) 
prioritise brevity over precision; (4) ground messaging in core values; (5) use clear, concise language rather 
than jargon; (6) focus on actions; (7) craft messaging around your audience not yourself.
Sixth, Christiano (2017: 12) argued that effective ‘public interest communications’ provide five rules that the 
most effective campaigns follow: (1) they are visual or rely on metaphor; (2) they connect with the values 
of the target audience; (3) they use stories; (4) their calls-to-action are highly focussed; and (5) they make 
use of emotion. Aside from these studies there are numerous other reports and articles addressing relevant 
issues such as integration (e.g. Ahad and Banulescu-Bogdan, 2018), emigration (ARK, 2018) or mapping ‘narra-
tive tactics in the migration sector’ (Field, 2020). 
The recommendations of these studies, some of which overlap, are shown in Table 1, below. The only recom-
mendation found in all six reports was to focus on values. However, each report offers fairly little practical 
information on what is meant by values, which values should be focused on and how should values be used.
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Develop a proactive communications strategy
Set up partnerships for communications/support others











Choose credible messengers, including migrants or moderates
Use succinct / digestible / focussed messaging
Be visual
Moreover, the above recommendations and studies by advocacy groups are so useful because their find-
ings derive from application and real-world experiences. However, the specificity and complexity of each 
particular real-world experience can lead to findings that are only particular to certain situations or biases 
that are difficult to detect outside of controlled settings. As such, it is useful to combine and place these 
practitioner recommendations within the broader scientifically-produced, theoretically-backed literature. In 
the next section we consider the academic literature on values and what consequences this has for strate-
gic messaging on migration.
What are values? 
Throughout the twentieth century, psychologists made numerous attempts to classify human ‘values’. For 
each of these classifications, the constituent ‘values’ are identifiable, are drawn from a finite set, tend to 
relate to each other in some systematic manner, vary little in strength or relative prioritisation within individ-
uals in the short term, vary more significantly in strength and relative prioritisation between individuals and 
can be successfully used as predictors for attitudes on more specific, temporal issues and human behaviour.
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Indeed, the importance of values as predictors of human attitudes and activity was noted at least as early 
as 1961 by Allport, who stated ‘personal values are the dominating force in life, and all of a person’s activity 
is directed toward the realization of his values. And so the focus for understanding is the other’s value-ori-
entation—or, we might say, his philosophy of life (Allport, 1961: 543).’ Some of the more prominent human 
value theories include those of Murray (1938), Rokeach (1973), Feather and Peay (1975), Maloney and Katz 
(1976), Hofstede (1980), Wicker et al. (1984), Cawley, Martin and Johnson (2000), Peterson and Seligman (2004), 
Schwartz (1992, 1994, 2012) and Talevich et al. (2017). Of note, besides the sheer breadth of these human 
value theories, is disconcerting observation of Jost et al. (2016: 351) that ‘these theorists’ conceptions bear 
little resemblance to one another.’
Perhaps the most eminent and broadly utilised of these values schema is Schwartz’s theory of basic person-
al values (1992). Schwartz defines values as cognitive representations of broad motivational goals, rather 
than attitudes towards particular situations, and as stable metrics of the guiding principles in individuals’ 
lives. This definition of values has been echoed in later works, such as Brosch and Sander (2013: 3) who de-
fine values as ‘stable motivational constructs or beliefs about desirable end states that transcend specific 
situations and guide the selection or evaluation of behaviours and events.’ Following empirical testing, 
Schwartz (1992) shows that there are ten essential values and within each of these are multiple ‘motivation-
al goals’ with accompanying hypothesised evolutionary causal mechanisms. These values are shown to be 
consistent across cultures. An eleventh value – spirituality – was initially proposed but then discarded after 
it was shown to vary considerably by culture, in contrast to the fundamental nature of the other values. The 
ten values, the basic motivation goal of each and the constituent goals—used as the foundations for the 
codification of the resultant values—are provided in Table 2.
Table 2.Schwartz’s 10 basic personal values (1992: 6-12, 24)
Value Basic motivational goal Specific goal examples
Universalism Understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for 
the welfare of all people and for nature
Social justice, inner harmony, equality, 
broadminded, unity with nature, pro-
tecting environment, a world at peace, 
world of beauty, wisdom
Benevolence Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people 
with whom one is in frequent personal contact
True friendship, mature love, meaning in 
life, responsible, loyal, helpful, honest, 
forgiving, spiritual life
Tradition Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs 
and ideas that one’s culture or religion impose on the 
individual
Humble, respect for tradition, moderate, 
devout, detachment, accepting portion 
in life
Conformity Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to 
upset or harm others and violate social expectations and 
norms
Obedient, honour parents, self-disci-
pline, politeness
Security Safety, harmony, and stability of society, of relationship 
and of self
National security, social order, family 
security, cleanliness, reciprocation of 
favours, sense of belonging, healthy
Power Attainment or preservation of a dominant position within 
the more general social system
Authority, wealth, social power, social 
recognition, preserving public image
Achievement Personal success through demonstrating competence 
according to social standards
Successful, ambitious, influential, capa-
ble, intelligent
Hedonism Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself Pleasure, enjoying life
Stimulation Excitement, novelty, and challenge in life (a varied life, an 
exciting life, daring)
Exciting life, varied life, daring
Self-Direction Independent thought and action – choosing, creating, 
exploring
Independent, freedom, curious, creativi-
ty, choosing own goals, self-respect
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Schwartz (1992) shows that these values can be arranged in relation to each other on two dimensions (first, 
self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement and, second, conservation vs. openness to change) as shown in 
Figure 1. Furthermore, this arrangement shows how some values share commonalties with others, and are 
thus placed side-by-side, whereas others are highly dissimilar and thus placed in direct opposition to each 
other. The result is four higher-order value types and two resulting bipolar value dimensions. The accord 
between this theory and empirical testing of it is notable (e.g. Schwartz, 1994), partially accounting for its 
popularity.
Figure 1. Schwartz’s (1992: 45) ‘Revised theoretical model of relations among motivational types of values, higher order value 
types and bipolar value dimensions’
A handful of political scientists and psychologists have attempted to use human value-based conceptual 
frameworks to explain variation in political attitudes (Rokeach, 1973; Knutsen, 1995; Schwartz, 1994; Gunther 
and Kuan, 2007, Jost et al., 2003, 2016). The theorised causal mechanism underlying such an explanation re-
lies on the assumption that ‘individuals hold the beliefs, opinions, and values they do because they address 
one or more psychological need or interest, such as those related to self-esteem maintenance, group cohe-
sion, or rationalisation of the social order (Jost et al., 2016: 352).’ For example, conservative positions such as 















and control (Jost et al., 2003). In turn, variation in the value-based correlates of liberalism and conservatism 
have been shown to be the result of neurocognitive structure and function, ‘especially when it comes to the 
anterior cingulate cortex and the amygdala (Jost et al, 2016: 353; see also Amodio et al, 2007 and Kandler et 
al., 2012)’. Furthermore, Jost et al (2016: 353) argue that values mediate the relationship between personality 
and ideology.’ In short, there is a strong theoretical and empirical foundation for the supposed link between 
values and political attitudes.
However, according to Feldman (2003: 479), this value-based approach to explaining variation in political 
attitudes has ‘not received sufficient attention’. Schwartz et al. (2010) also lament the absence of such in-
vestigations. They explain this dearth as the result of ‘the different intellectual and disciplinary origins’ of 
political scientists and psychologists and the tendency of the former to see fundamental values in such 
political terms as egalitarianism, ethnocentrism etc., despite these plainly operating at more proximal po-
sition to more fundamental non-political, all-encompassing human values (Schwartz et al, 2010: 422). They 
(2010: 422) show that Schwartz’s ten comprehensive personal values act as effective predictors of ten core 
political values (e.g. law and order, civil liberties etc.) and, ultimately, party choice at the ballot box (see also 
Piurko et al, 2011; Schwartz et al 2014).
How do values affect attitudes to immigration?
Despite the vast literature seeking to explain variation in attitudes to immigration, psychological explana-
tions, including those using personal values, remain relatively few. This dearth is only highlighted further 
when we consider the sizeable literature devoted to causal mechanisms such as ‘contact theory’ or ‘eco-
nomic marginalisation’, both of which are likely to affect far fewer citizens than the universal existence of 
personal values and, intuitively, are likely to have weaker effects given their more superficial, short-term 
nature compared to deep-seated values.
The most developed and important attempts so far to test the relationship between values and attitudes 
to immigration are those of Sagiv and Schwartz (1995), Davidov and Meuleman (2012) and Davidov et al 
(2018; 2014). In these studies, the authors use pan-European data to show that Schwartz’s value system can 
successfully predict attitudes to immigration. The authors find that the two values of ‘universalism’ and ‘be-
nevolence’ increase positivity to immigration, particularly the former, whereas the three values of ‘security’, 
‘conformity’ and ‘tradition’—together making up the ‘conservation’ higher order value—decrease positivity 
to immigration.
Demonstrating the relationship between values and attitudes to immigration
I now briefly turn to demonstrating this relationship between values and attitudes to immigration by com-
paring the entire value-orientation of different groups of Europeans according to their attitudes to migra-
tion, rather than testing specific relationships. To do so, I use data from the ninth, most recent, wave of the 
European Social Survey (ESS). This is formed of data collected between 2018 and 2019 in 19 countries.1 The 
ESS is a biannual cross-national survey based on face-to-face interviews in each participating country. The 
ESS is unique in that it provides high-quality data, covering an extremely broad range of political attitudes, 
amongst other variables, across every region of Europe, as well as Israel. Respondents are selected by 
1 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Switzerland, Cyprus, Czechia, Germany, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia (excluded from this report’s analysis) and Slovenia.
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probability sampling of residents who are aged 15 or over. The ESS allows for weighting by both country 
population size and according to stratification.
The ninth round of the ESS includes three questions measuring attitudes to the admission of immigrants2. 
These are:
• “Should your country allow (1) many, (2) some, (3) a few or (4) no immigrants from poorer 
countries out of Europe?” 
• “Should your country allow (1) many, (2) some, (3) a few or (4) no immigrants of a different race/
ethnic group from the majority?” 
• “Should your country allow (1) many, (2) some, (3) a few or (4) no immigrants of the same race/
ethnic group from the majority?” 
Using these three variables, I create a variable that is the mean response to the above three questions, 
which, therefore, exists on the same 1-4 scale, with 1 indicating that the respondent was in favour of the 
admission of ‘many’ of each of the three groups and 4 indicating that the respondent was in favour of the 
admission of ‘none’ of the each of the three groups. For the purposes of visualisation below, I then place 
each respondent into one of four groups: strongly anti-immigration (scoring 3 or above; weighted 26.3% 
of Europeans); leaning anti-immigration (scoring between 2 and 3; weighted 20.0% of Europeans); leaning 
pro-immigration (scoring exactly 2; 30.5% of Europeans); and strongly pro-immigration (scoring less than 2; 
23.2% of Europeans).
The ESS includes 21 variables that seek to measure Schwartz’s 10 basic human values, as described above. 
These are outlined in Table 3.
Table 3: Schwartz’s (1992) ten values and their ESS 2014 operationalisation
Value ESS operationalisation (underlining by author)
Question: “Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much 
each person is or is not like you.”
Responses: (1) Very much like me (2) Like me (3) Somewhat like me (4) A little like me (5) Not like me (6) 
Not like me at all
1 Universal-
ism
She3 thinks it is important that every person in the world should be treated equally. She believes everyone 
should have equal opportunities in life.
It is important to her to listen to people who are different4 from her. Even when she disagrees with them, she 
still wants to understand them.
She strongly believes that people should care for5 nature. Looking after the environment is important to her.
2 Benevolence It’s very important to her to help the people around her. She wants to care for6 their well-being.
It is important to her to be loyal to her friends. She wants to devote7 herself to people close to her.
3 Tradition Tradition is important to her. She tries to follow the customs handed down by her religion or his family.
It is important to her to be humble and modest. She tries not to draw attention to herself.  
2 The ESS also includes three questions on the perceived economic, quality of life and cultural effects of immigration, which I do not 
explore here.
3 Feminine pronouns and possessives are used when the respondent is female. Masculine pronouns and possessives are used 
when the respondent is male.
4 “Different” in almost any way.  The key idea is that he sees difference/diversity positively and as something worth learning about.
5 “care for”: look after, basically synonymous with ‘looking after’ in the second sentence
6 “care for”: here in the sense of actively promote their well-being.
7 “Devote”: is intended to convey deep concern for these people and readiness to invest his time, resources and energy in their 
welfare.
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4 Conformity It is important to her always to behave properly. She wants to avoid doing anything people would say is 
wrong. 
She believes that people should do what they’re told8. She thinks people should follow rules9 at all times, 
even when no-one is watching.
5 Security It is important to her to live in secure10 surroundings. She avoids anything that might endanger her safety. 
It is important to her that the government ensures11 her safety against all threats. She wants the state to be 
strong so it can defend its citizens.
6 Power It is important to her to get12 respect from others. She wants people to do what she says.
It is important to her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of money and expensive13 things.
7 Achieve-
ment
Being very successful is important to her. She hopes people will recognise her achievements.
It’s important to her to show14 her abilities. She wants people to admire15 what she does. 
8 Hedonism Having a good time is important to her. She likes to “spoil”16 herself.
she seeks every chance17 She can to have fun. It is important to her to do things that give her pleasure.
9 Stimulation She likes surprises and is always looking for new things to do. She thinks it is important to do lots of differ-
ent things in life18.
She looks for adventures and likes to take risks. She wants to have an exciting19 life.
10 Self-Direc-
tion
It is important to her to make her own decisions about what she does. She likes to be free and not depen-
d20on others.
Thinking up new ideas21 and being creative is important to her. She likes to do things in her own original 
way.
In Figure 2, the distribution of values across each of the four groups is outlined, measured as z-scores (i.e. stan-
dard deviations from the mean, which is 0). A higher score indicates that the value is more common in that group 
than in the general population, with a negative scoring indicating the opposite. As we can see, there is a clear 
pattern whereby:
• Strongly anti-immigration Europeans tend to value conformity, security, tradition and power above 
the European average. Conversely, they are far less likely to value universalism, benevolence, 
self-direction, stimulation or hedonism.
• Europeans strongly pro-immigration tend to have the opposite value orientation, but far more 
magnified. They have the most skewed value orientation of any group and, above all, value univer-
salism highly and undervalue security and conformity.
• The two more moderate groups have, by contrast, balanced value orientations.
Figure 2. Value orientations of four groups of Europeans
8 The idea here is that when someone else tells you what to  do in actual interpersonal interaction,(implying also that the person has some 
authority), you should do it.
9 “Rules” in the sense of ‘rules and regulations’.
10 In the sense of the surroundings actually being secure, and not that he feels secure.
11 “Ensures” in the sense of ‘guarantees’. 
12 Get/have this respect, not deserve respect
13 “Expensive”: in the sense of costing a lot rather than being ‘luxury’ items.
14 The idea is to show whatever abilities he has, with no assumption that he actually has great abilities.  It is important to him to be per-
ceived as being able.
15 He wants his actions to be admired, not his person.
16 “Spoil herself”: “treat herself” is another idiom.  Strongly negative ‘self-indulgence’ is not intended.
17 Seeks: active pursuit rather than ‘taking every’ chance.
18 Important for himself (his life) is the focus.
19 “Exciting” more in the sense of ‘exhilarating’ than ‘dangerous’.
20 In the sense of not to have to depend on people
21 Having new ideas, with an emphasis on the creative side of having them through generating them himself.
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How to communicate on migration using values
Having defined values and demonstrated their relationship with attitudes to immigration, we now turn to 
considering how to use this information to persuasively communicate on immigration using values.  Overall, 
based on the above literature, we can deduce that messaging is most likely to elicit sympathy when the val-
ues it contains are concordant with those of recipient, this relationship is shown in Figure 3. In other words:
Recipients will be sympathetic to a message when its values align with their 
own and they will be antipathetic to a message when its values diverge from 
their own.
Figure 3. A model of the effect of value-based 

















































































Specifically to the case of migration, and following on from the review on the relationship between values 
and attitudes to immigration, when migration messaging is framed in values of self-transcendence (univer-
salism and benevolence) or openness to change (self-direction, stimulation, hedonism) it is more likely to 
be supported by those already favouring immigration. When migration messaging is framed in values of 
conservation (security, tradition or conformity) or self-enhancement (power and to a lesser extent achieve-
ment) it is more likely to be supported by those already opposing immigration. To be most effective, mes-
saging should use the opposite values of those already associated with its argument. For pro-immigration 
messaging, this means, conformity, tradition, security and power. For anti-immigration messaging this means 
universalism, benevolence and self-direction. These relationships are shown in Table 4.
Table 4. The effect of the values-basis of pro- and anti-immigration messaging on attitudes to immigration
Argument type Appeal to values of … Result




• Increase polarisation / salience




• Decrease polarisation / salience




• Increase polarisation / salience
Conformity, tradition, security, 
power
• Energise existing supporters
• Supporters indifferent
• Increase polarisation / salience
Examples of existing value-based communication on migration 
We now move to applying the above theoretical expectations to classifying real-world examples of migra-
tion communication. I use an inventory of 135 migration campaigns as collected by the ICMPD as the source 
of the campaigns. Because this inventory was not collected for this report, it can be considered as having 
the advantages of incidental data.
The contents of the inventory are attached to the appendix of this report. The campaigns include those 
from the period 2009-2019 in EU member states and states in the southern and eastern Mediterranean 
(Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia). Campaigns come from national gov-
ernments, international organisations, NGOs and the private sector and some political parties that held 
campaigns specific to migration policy. Campaigns are defined to not include media coverage but instead 
be planned activities with a goal of social or political change.
The vast majority of the campaigns within the inventory have the aim of changing attitudes towards im-
migration, often amongst other aims. However, a number are specifically related to emigration, smuggling 
and trafficking prevention or advertising services. I remove these campaigns for the sake of this analysis, 
leaving 106 campaigns. I then divide these into two groups, those with a pro-immigration message (98 
campaigns) and those with an anti-immigration message (eight campaigns). Clearly, the inventory is by no 
means balanced, owing in large part to the sources of the campaigns (see above). It is neither by any means 
exhaustive, given that anti-immigration policy campaigns in the last ten years by radical right parties across 
Europe would likely number in the hundreds; though it does provide indicative and illustrative examples, 
as we shall see.
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The ubiquity of ‘migrant’s journey’ videos
Of these 98 campaigns, 35 held focussed on the ‘migrant’s journey’ narrative, essentially a retrospective nar-
rative that typically details the trials and tribulations migrants faced leading to their decision to emigration, 
while on the journey and again once resident in the host country. These almost always held the overarching 
narrative point that migrants were victims, with the focus on refugees. Notably, 27 of these 35 campaigns 
were made in video format. They are summarised in Appendix 1. In Figure 4, below, I show four stills from 
a fairly typical graphical video of the journey undertaken by a refugee from the moment of fleeing her 
country to receiving refugee status in Estonia. A billboards campaign was launched in five Estonian cities 
to introduce the webpage. The third part of the campaign was a direct mailing to reach target groups in 
cities and rural areas. The delivered postcards told the stories of three different refugees who were forced 
to flee their countries.
Figure 4. Example of a ‘migrant’s journey’ prototype of migrant communication. Source: Estonian Human Rights Centre. 
Available at https://humanrights.ee/pagulane/eng/
These campaigns, arguably, focus on the value of benevolence, as well as universalism. These campaigns 
are therefore likely to be most effective at mobilising those who are already sympathetic to the message—
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for example, by encouraging fundraising 
or political mobilisation. However, these 
campaigns as attempts to move public 
opinion are somewhat limited, regard-
less of their values-basis, because they 
are retrospective and therefore unable 
to fulfil the strategic forward-looking 
motivational goals that values underpin. 
Moreover, they are unlikely to be ef-
fective at convincing moderate citizens 
given their focus on a single value that 




The remaining 63 campaigns represent a 
very broad spectrum in terms of format 
and approach. Of these 63 campaigns, 18 
focus on migrants’ lives once living in the 
host country (some others partially have 
this focus). The majority of these, around 
15 of the 18 here, have no obvious, partic-
ular value-basis, instead focussing purely 
on attempting to humanise migrants. In a 
sense, the value-basis of these could be 
classified as universalism. Four examples 
of these are shown in Figure 5, below.
Figure 5. Four examples of ‘humanising 
migrants’ campaigns. Clockwise, from the top: 
AMITIE campaign (2012)22; Living Together 
campaign(#ةقادصلا_كراش, “#sharethefriendship 
201823); Vota per me (Vote for me) campaign; 
Gegen (2013)24 Vorurteile (Against prejudice) 
campaign (2015)25
However, three of these had more ex-
plicit values-bases beyond universalism 
and benevolence. These clearly pointed 
to the ability of migrants to support oth-
er broad motivation goals. Three social 
media posts from one of these cam-
paigns—‘We are Upper Austria’ (Wir Sind 
Oberösterreich)—and one from a series 
entitled ‘I am a stranger until you get to 







Figure 6. Values-based pro-migration messaging. “We are Upper Austria26”; “Yesterday refugee, today medic. I am a stranger 
until you get to know me”27
These four examples below express migration in value-terms. Most obviously this is in terms of the econom-
ic or labour contribution of each of the migrants pictured. In Schwarz’s values-scheme, this would fall under 
the value category of ‘power’. However, more subtly, each of the pieces of communication speak to other 
values that fall under the ‘conservation’ higher order value type. The three Austrian examples each show 
migrants collaborating with native Austrians, in two cases wearing uniforms: this is an allusion to ‘conformity’. 
The examples of the firefighter, medic and nurse, each concerned with health and safety, point to the value 
of ‘security’. Finally, the implied apprenticeship (or similar) relationships in the top two examples may also 
allude to the value of ‘tradition’. Overall, each of these messaging examples has a value-basis that includes 
at least one of the values regularly associated with anti-immigration sentiment. According to this report’s 
theoretical model, we should therefore expect these to be more effective examples of persuasive messag-
ing. The remaining 45 pro-immigration campaigns came in a remarkable variety of formats. However, few 
contained an obvious values-basis. This is not to suggest that they were ineffective. Many indeed fulfilled 
other recommendations as laid out earlier in this report. 
Values-based anti-immigration messaging
The inventory of migration messaging campaigns that this study is based on included just eight anti-im-
migration campaigns. However, all of them had a value-basis. Furthermore, the majority spoke to values 
associated with pro-immigration sentiment and so potentially appealing to moderates. In Figure 7, below, I 
outline examples of those based on the values of ‘security’, ‘tradition’, ‘conformity’ and ‘power’. 
Figure 7. Values-based (‘security’, ‘tradition’, ‘conformity’ and ‘power’) anti-immigration messaging. Top left: ‘The forcible 
relocation endangers our culture and traditions.” Top right: ‘Migration pact = focus on maintaining the culture of origin of 





The top left is a page from an anti-migrant booklet passed out by the Hungarian government. The title 
reads ‘The forcible relocation endangers our culture and traditions’ and then says ‘Several hundred ‘no-go’ 
areas in Europe’s big cities’ itself pointing to the value of security. The top right example is from the Flem-
ish far-right party ‘Flemish Block’. It reads ‘Migration pact = focus on maintaining the culture of origin of 
migrant’. The bottom right is also from the same series and reads ‘Migration pact = difficulty in organizing 
returns’. These respectively are based on the values of ‘conformity’ and ‘tradition’ and ‘security’ and ‘power’. 
Finally, the bottom left campaign comes from the German far right party ‘Alternative for Germany’ and reads 
‘So that Europe does not become Eurabia!’ while showing an Orientalist painting of a white woman at an 
Arab slave auction, speaking to the values of ‘security’ and ‘power’.
Below, in Figure 8, we see four examples of anti-immigration messaging based on the values of ‘univer-
salism’, ‘benevolence’, ‘self-direction’ and ‘stimulation’. The top left comes from a campaign against the 
Global Compact for Migration and implies that the ‘migration pact’ and, presumably, migration moreover 
are threats to tolerance rather than a form of tolerance, a ‘universalist’ value. In doing so, it speaks to an 
argument often used by the radical right in Europe regarding the social conservatism, particularly on issues 
of LGBT and women’s rights, of some migrants. The second, from the youth organisation of the French far 
right party ‘Front National’ states that ‘Sandra has been sleeping in her car with her son for three months. 
Unfortunately for her, she is not a migrant’, making an argument based on the value of ‘benevolence’. The 
bottom two, both from the Identitarian Generation anti-immigration social movement state, on the left, ‘I 
live an experience out of the ordinary. I defend my country’ and, on the right, ‘I want to be the new breath 
that is going to change our country’. These speak to ‘stimulation’ and ‘self-direction’, respectively.
Figure 8. Values-based (‘universalism’, ‘benevolence’, ‘self-direction’, ‘stimulation’) anti-immigration messaging .  
Top right: ‘Sandra has been sleeping in her car with her son for three months. Unfortunately for her she is not a migrant’ (2018);  
Bottom left: ‘I live an experience out of the ordinary (2019). I defend my country.’ Bottom right: ‘‘I want to be the new breath that 
is going to change our country’ (2019).
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Discussion
This report started by providing a summary of key recommendations from existing best-practice guides for 
migration communication. Though the most common recommendation is to focus on values-based messag-
ing, very little work has considered what values-based messaging is and what type of value-based messag-
ing is likely to work regarding migration. I then summarised the academic literature on values, focussing on 
Schwarz’s theory of basic human values: broad, stable motivational goals that individuals hold in life, which 
predict attitudes to specific issues and behaviour. The relationship between these ten values are graphically 
displayed: universalism, benevolence, stimulation and self-direction are associated with pro-immigration 
attitudes, whereas conformity, security, tradition and power are associated with anti-immigration attitudes.
Theoretically, I argue that aligning migration policy communication with the values of the target audience 
values is likely to elicit greater sympathy for the message. Values-based messages that do not align with 
those of the audience are less likely to elicit sympathy and may elicit antipathy. This report then analysed 
migration policy communication examples from an inventory of 135 campaigns from both sides of the 
Mediterranean provided by the ICMPD. It is then systematically considered how well these campaigns align 
with expectations as derived from the theoretical framework. Few pro-migration campaigns contained val-
ue-based messaging, whereas all anti-migration campaigns did. Similarly, very few pro-migration campaigns 
included values besides ‘universalism’ and ‘benevolence’, whereas anti-migration campaigns included values 
associated with both pro- and anti-migration attitudes. Examples of each case were visually demonstrated.
This report provides policymakers with an understanding of what values-based policy communication is 
and how, using robust data, they can communicate policies that are concordant with the values of their 
audiences in a way likely to elicit sympathy. Although this report uses the example of migration policy 
communication, the same approach can be taken for policies on any politically controversial issue. Future 
migration policy communication that seeks to incorporate values should use a systematic approach such as 
that found in this study and seek to incorporate the values of the target audience. Future research should 
robustly test the effects of each of these kinds of communication using experimental methods, be they 
field, lab or survey experiments. Alternative values-scheme and forms psychological predispositions, for 
example, personality types, should also be considered.
25
Afterword 
Communication, as all human activities, must be value-based. No single art is able to stand-alone, be cred-
ible, justified and productive unless it fits into a mechanism (a plan, a policy development, a socio-cultural 
project, a full-fledged strategy) where it provides an added value for a collective benefice.
Migration has always been an intrinsic inclination of human beings. It has always historically had a dual main 
objective: to escape from uncomfortable living conditions and to try to seek a friendlier environment where 
to build a better future.
Investigating human attitudes in this context cannot be considered a “mission impossible”. On the contrary, 
this is a crucial step for political leaders, scientists and academics to be fully aware of the risks of geo-so-
cio-political instabilities in our society.
Likewise, communicators must honour their key obligations. They have to witness the phenomenology and 
share communalities, to facilitate comprehension and governance. They also have to duly inform citizens 
and help understand how societies can draw lessons from trends, opportunities and threats, in order to be-
come more resilient, interactive and cooperative. This is even more relevant in times of crisis, as the global 
pandemic has made dramatically evident.
This report, which focuses on value-based communication in the field of migration, aims to better interpret 
figures and methodologies and thoroughly explore relations between values and attitudes. To this end, it 
suggests a more constructive way to handle controversial issues through a reasonably balanced approach, 
without indulging in prejudices, stereotypes or slogans, but using communication as a real science at the 
service of the citizens. 
Vincenzo Le Voci 
Secretary General Club of Venice 
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